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not hard for a person that has learned the recipe (and knows about cakes) with this missing step, to realize that the sugar is missing and that one should add more sugar to have a good cake. In this case it is very clear that there are social standards as to what is the right amount of sugar in a cake that allow the instructions to be corrected. But it is clear that attributing the normalization to the instructions, here, misplaces the locus of action by misplacing the source of the norm. Rather, it seems, it is the cultural context that includes the education of our taste what normalize the instructions.
Dawkins would like to say that this is not the sort of instructions he has in mind, but prima facie, at least, making a cake is as paradigmatic example of culture as is the Origami technique. It seems that for Dawkins the notion of "instruction" that matters is supported by the analogy with neo-Darwinian biology and in particular the assumption that there is a universal selection mechanism that works on this abstraction. But this imposes a view of culture that is too restrictive. Of course models must have a normative role in ordering the sort of phenomena we want to understand, but the success of population biology in achieving the synthesis between genetics and natural selection can be attributed to a mechanism that fails to support the required distinction.
If we focus in the history of science instead of a thought experiment a more fundamental problem comes to the fore. The history of science suggests an important sense in which self normalization (and thus stability of practices) should Technological scaffoldings -8 -not be assumed to be a matter of transmitting instructions.
2 Think of Euclidean
Geometry. Netz has very convincingly shown that the "shaping of deduction"
(taking place through the development of Euclidean Geometry) requires understanding the role played by two different tools, mathematical language and diagrams (Netz 1999) . Diagrams exploit (visual) cognitive resources. These resources are combined into a method that generates the artifact that we identify as
Euclidean geometry. The artifact is such that it generates products that have a convincing generality. They produce norms and standards (theorems in this case).
Netz claims that Euclidean geometry achieves its generality through the way in which different basic parts which are the result of the combination of linguistic and diagrammatic resources constitute a "tool box". history; and furthermore, the rate of "mutation" of its practices makes of (particularly some) scientific practices as natural a model for the study of cultural evolution, as drosophilae fruit flies for studying evolution.
There is yet another sort of argument that points to the importance of shared practices to model cultural evolution. years ago, when art, architecture and writing suddenly appear (Gamble 2010). This is considered to be evidence for the emergence of the sort of symbol-based cognition that distinguishes the human mind. This usual answer is of course in accordance with the received view about implausibility of the thesis of continuity that did guided most thinking about cultural evolution in the 20 th century. The problem is that the evidence points to the fact that increases in brain size during about 500,000 years are not matched by comparable changes in technology. This fact suggests that symbol processing might not be the right sort of process to focus on to understand the evolutionary process that allow us to frame appropriately the question of when and how the hominid brain became the human mind.
4.The Evolution of the
Gamble points to an answer that implicitly promotes the sort of continuity that I am arguing for. He starts with the social brain hypothesis, according to which our social lives drove the enlargement of our brains and considers that the encephalization event 600,000 years ago has two major consequences. One is that a strong relationship exists between neocortex size and group size among primates (Aiello and Dunbar 1993). And two, as Aiello and Wheeler (1995) pointed out, such an increase in brain size was correlated with a decreasing gut. This leads to increased use of animal protein and cooking with fire. Encephalization thus becomes a selective pressure on the development of ways in which individuals can live in larger groups (not necessarily consisting of an integrated group of individuals but some sort of pattern of dispersed local groups drawn from the wider community). This leads to a form of sociality (that seems to be characteristic of all hominins) in which several grouping levels are loosely connected in time and space but potentially accessible as resources for a common aim. Aiello and Dunbar (1993) propose that larger communities would have required new ways to facilitate interaction. Language would be one solution to the extent that it permits hominins to use the environment as a scaffolding for the interaction of agents. Cooking, says
Gamble, becomes part of the cognitive architecture of hominins since it coupled brain size with an external manipulation of the environment.
But there is a more basic kind of scaffolding that would be required for extended cognition to shape the evolutionary process of the human mind (in accordance to the continuity thesis). Increases in community size due to encephalization puts pressure on ways in which more complex sort of integration of We have suggested that we should start thinking of the question as a question about how mechanisms of production of items of a kind (mechanisms of re production) and (relatively specific) mechanisms promoting stability, all of them embodied in practices, interact to produce cultural phenomena that can function as scaffoldings for spreading and innovating cultural products that centrally involve enculturation or enskillment in material culture, as well as specific forms of cognitive embodiment (that should be seen as kinds of evolvability). 4 In particular, this framework should account for innovation and its relation to transmission and stability in a non ad hoc way. Dawkins universalist bent leads him, and many others, to assume that there is a mechanism, imitation, that explains both the spread and stability of culture. We have already mentioned that there is important experimental work that shows that this is a questionable assumption. The long and inconclusive discussion about the definition of imitation should end with the conclusion that there is not one notion of imitation that plays the central role usually ascribed to it in models of cultural evolution. 
Diagrams as technology of cognition.
The discourse about human culture often pointed to the importance of literacy in the development of organizations (and institutions) that are more complex than cultures without systems. Writing allows for ideas, standards (and among them arguments) and norms to be "fixed"
or anchored (to a text), and thus to have generalizing power, in the sense that ideas and standards can be reproduced in different contexts as concrete exemplifications of general norms (Goody 1986; 2008) . In this way, written norms and standards become abstract representations of more concrete norms.
They are abstract in the sense that they have the capacity to reproduce its representings in the context of the relevant (lineages of) practices.
The formulation of codes and norms encourage its spreading through specialization, which involves tailoring the norm for more specific contexts and thus promotes its diversification. Goody has shown how written norms can be seen as part of systems of norms than become more and more abstract through its dispersion and specialization in more and more specific contexts (and thus more concrete too). It is crucial to Kaiser's approach and for our purpose in this paper that contrary to the assumption common in the sociology of knowledge and in science studies, scientific diagrams (and in general artifacts) are not immutable, quite the contrary, they are highly mutable. Kaiser shows that there are very clear differences between different groups of practitioners and that such differences tend to be inherited through their lineages, which form around the teaching and 
Notes
1 A mechanism is a description of a causal relation in terms of parts of the mechanism, in such a way that the nature of the parts and the way in which such parts interact among themselves and with the environment allow us to predict and (often to understand) the way in which changes in context will change the functioning of the mechanism. Thus, if we think that there all change can be explained by one basic mechanism that has universal scope the problem of determining the explanatory scope disappears at once. In this case the only problem remaining would be the elaboration of the details of how the mechanism applies to specific cases. The appeal of talk of a universal mechanism of natural selection is related to this idea.
instructions, but this is often not enough.
3 See for example several articles in Dunbar et al 2010, and in particular Lehmann, Andrews and Dunbar 2010. 4 As Coward and Gamble put it: "embodied, vocal material and symbolic resources all become interlinked in the practice of everyday life. However, what we seem to see during hominin evolution is the gradual adoption of material resources to complement our primate heritage of corporal and emotional social strategies" (Coward and Gamble 2008, 1973) . 5 The stethoscope can also represent in a different sense. For example, it can be used as a symbol that tells us that there is a physician in a certain place. 
